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Rules of Engagement and Legal 
Frameworks for Multinational 
Counter-Piracy Operations 
Laurie R. Blank* 
Three multinational counter-piracy task forces operate in 
the Gulf of Aden to protect shipping in this vital transit corridor 
and respond to pirate attacks. These task forces and units from 
different states play a critical role in combating piracy, but also 
present challenges with regard to the legal and operational 
frameworks and coordination necessary to keep those operations 
running smoothly. The law applicable to counter-piracy 
operations governs the use of force against pirates, the 
treatment of captured pirates, and the prosecution of pirates, 
among other key issues. The relevant legal frameworks and rules 
of engagement create a complicated interrelationship that can 
pose challenges in the context of multinational operations. After 
analyzing the legal frameworks that could and do apply to 
counter-piracy operations by military forces, this article then 
builds on those frameworks with a discussion of rules of 
engagement and the specific challenges multinational operations 
face in coordinating and implementing effective rules of 
engagement in counter-piracy operations. 
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I.  Introduction 
In response to the upsurge in piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the 
international community has established three multinational 
counter-piracy task forces to protect shipping in this vital transit 
corridor and respond to pirate attacks. Beginning in August 2009, 
NATO vessels and aircraft have patrolled the waters off the Horn of 
Africa as part of NATO Operation Ocean Shield. The overall mission 
is “to contribute to international efforts to counter maritime piracy  
* Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University 
School of Law. I would like to thank Martin Bunt (J.D. 2013, Emory 
Law School), Laura Brockelman (J.D. 2012, Emory Law School), Katie 
Skeehan (J.D. 2013, Emory Law School), and Matthew Langton (L.L.B., 
Trinity College Dublin) for their valuable research assistance. 
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while participating in capacity building efforts with regional 
governments.”1 Operation Atalanta, a European Union naval force, 
has a mandate to “deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast . . . to protect[] vessels of the 
World Food Programme (WFP) delivering aid to displaced persons in 
Somalia and . . . African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) 
shipping.”2 Last, Combined Maritime Force Task Force 151 was 
established in January 2009, with a specific piracy mission-based 
mandate, in order to build on the then existing maritime security 
mission of Task Force 150. Task Force 151’s mission is “to disrupt 
piracy and armed robbery at sea and to engage with regional and 
other partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities in 
order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of 
navigation.”3 The three task forces—each of which involves vessels 
and manpower from many different states—coordinate regularly on 
both training and operations.  
The multitude of task forces and units from different states are 
playing a critical role in combating piracy and protecting shipping, 
but the legal and operational frameworks and coordination necessary 
to keep those operations running smoothly also present substantial 
challenges and complexities. This article explores how the legal 
frameworks and the rules of engagement applicable to counter-piracy 
operations create a complicated interrelationship that can pose 
challenges in the context of multinational operations. Part II analyzes 
the legal frameworks that could and do apply to counter-piracy 
operations by military forces. Parts III and IV then build on those 
frameworks with a discussion of rules of engagement and the specific 
challenges multinational operations face in coordinating and 
implementing effective rules of engagement in counter-piracy 
operations. 
II. Legal Frameworks 
The law applicable to counter-piracy operations governs how a 
state or multinational force uses force against pirates, how pirates are 
treated if captured, the crimes for which pirates can be prosecuted, 
and the mechanisms that can be used in such prosecutions. The U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the primary law 
 
1. MARCOM Factsheet—Operation Ocean Shield, MAR. COMMAND NATO, 
http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/Operation%20Ocean%20Shield.as
px (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). 
2. Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, EUNAVFOR, 
http://eunavfor.eu/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
3. CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://combined 
maritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
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applicable to piracy, but it is also important to analyze any other 
relevant legal frameworks, particularly given the extensive 
involvement of national, regional, and international forces with the 
authority to use force in the process of deterring pirates and 
responding to pirate attacks. Under UNCLOS, force can be used to 
combat and apprehend pirates in accordance with minimum 
international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. For 
example, Article 8 of the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation declares, “[a]ny use of force pursuant to this article shall 
not exceed the minimum degree of force which is necessary and 
reasonable in the circumstances.”4 The U.N. Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states: 
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons 
except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of 
a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to 
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their 
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only when less 
extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives. In 
any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made 
when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.5 
Few cases directly address how UNCLOS applies to the use of 
military force to combat piracy. In the M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case, the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea determined that, in the 
absence of instructive provisions on the use of force in UNCLOS, 
general international law requires that “the use of force must be 
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not 
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.”6  
The use of military force and military units and vessels from 
many different states may suggest to some that the law of armed 
 
4. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 8, opened for signature 
Feb. 14, 2006, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force July 28, 
2010) (adding article 8bis to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation). 
5. United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on 
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (emphasis added). 
6. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of 
July 1, 1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 10, 61–62. The Tribunal declared a system 
of “normal practice” to be used in effecting arrests that includes 
requests to stop, warning shots and an eventual use of force as a last 
resort. Id. at 62. 
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conflict must govern any engagements between such military forces 
and any pirates. As one Member of the British Parliament noted at a 
House of Lords European Union Committee meeting, “[y]ou say that 
it is not a war; it looks quite like one to many of us serving on the 
side.”7 The law of armed conflict (LOAC)—otherwise known as 
international humanitarian law or the law of war8—applies only 
during an armed conflict. Accordingly, determining whether violence 
between states, between a state and a non-state actor, or between two 
or more non-state actors rises to the level of an armed conflict is a 
foundational analytical step. The 1949 Geneva Conventions set forth 
two primary and comprehensive categories of armed conflict that 
trigger the application of LOAC: international armed conflict and 
non-international armed conflict. Determining the existence of an 
armed conflict does not turn on a formal declaration of war—or even 
on how the participants characterize the hostilities—but rather on the 
facts of a given situation.9 It is important to remember that this 
 
7. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, COMBATING SOMALI PIRACY: THE EU’S 
NAVAL OPERATION ATALANTA, 2009-10, H.L. 103, ¶ 113 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ 
ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf. 
8. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Advisory Service on International 
Humanitarian Law: What Is International Humanitarian Law?, at 1 
(July 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ 
what_is_ihl.pdf. The law of armed conflict is codified primarily in the 
four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third 
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.  
9. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 
32 (stating that the Convention applies to “all cases of declared war or 
of any other armed conflict . . . between two or more [states], even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them”); Anthony Cullen, Key 
Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in 
International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 85 (2005) (“[I]t is 
worth emphasizing that recognition of the existence of armed conflict is 
not a matter of state discretion.”).  
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objective paradigm applies regardless of whether a state is reluctant 
to characterize a situation as an armed conflict or a state is perhaps 
over eager to apply the armed conflict label (such as the rhetorical 
tool of a “war against piracy”). In either case, it is the facts on the 
ground that will determine whether an armed conflict exists such that 
LOAC is triggered. At the same time, however, if there is no armed 
conflict, LOAC will not apply. 
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 
states that the Conventions “shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more 
of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them.”10 Thus, any dispute between two states 
involving their armed forces is an international armed conflict, 
regardless of duration, the nature of the engagement between the 
armed forces, or the denial by one or both parties of an armed 
conflict. Current counter-piracy operations do involve the armed 
forces of many states, but in no situation are the forces of two states 
in conflict with each other. Instead, states are combating private 
actors or, at most, non-state groups operating for pecuniary gain. As 
a result, counter-piracy operations do not qualify as international 
armed conflict, even if and when force is used.  
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 sets 
forth minimum provisions applicable “[i]n the case of armed conflict 
not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties.”11 Non-international armed conflict is 
generally defined as “protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”12 Characterization of non-international armed conflict 
is more complex than the identification of international armed 
conflict, because the line between government response to internal 
disturbances and unrest, such as crime and riots, and government 
 
10. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., First Geneva 
Convention, supra note 8, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32. 
11. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., First Geneva 
Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32. 
12. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). This so-called Tadić test has not only 
been the driving factor in the ICTY’s jurisprudence, but it was also 
adopted by the drafters of the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court and by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 620 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(noting that in order to determine the existence of an internal armed 
conflict, it is necessary to evaluate the intensity and organization of the 
parties); Cullen, supra note 9, at 98.  
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response to an armed dissident threat resulting in a situation of 
armed conflict can often be quite blurry. Courts and tribunals 
generally look to two primary criteria—the intensity of the violence 
and the organization of the parties—to help “distinguish[] an armed 
conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or 
terrorist activities, which are not subject to international 
humanitarian law.”13 
With regard to piracy and counter-piracy operations, the analysis 
of whether pirate attacks and the involvement of state and 
multinational forces to combat those attacks with military force, if 
needed, constitutes armed conflict must look to the intensity of the 
violence and the organization of the parties. One other factor is 
equally useful: the nature of the response of the government or state 
armed forces in seeking to quell the violence.14 Although the intensity 
of the violence associated with piracy seems to accord with, or even 
exceed, that found in some conflicts, the response of the international 
community, the lack of any organization or coordination among the 
pirates, and the nature of the military response demonstrates that the 
situation in the Gulf of Aden (or other current pirate hot spots) does 
not constitute a non-international armed conflict. 
Piracy certainly involves the use of sophisticated weaponry and 
causes serious damage to both property and human life. In particular, 
although the loss of life does not rise to a level often seen in armed 
conflicts, the frequency of encounters is striking. In 2010 alone, for 
example, there were 489 incidents of piracy, an increase of 
20.4 percent over the previous year.15 In addition, the U.N. Security 
Council has recognized that “incidents of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea in the waters off the coast of Somalia exacerbate the situation in 
Somalia which continues to constitute a threat to international peace 
 
13. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 562 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).  
14. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA 
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR VOL. 
III, at 36 (Jean S. Pictet ed., A. P. de Heney trans., 1960) (advising that 
one of the “convenient criteria” for determining a non-international 
armed conflict is whether the government is “obliged to have recourse to 
the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military”).  
15. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report – 2010, ¶ 5, IMO 
MSC.4/Circ.169 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.imo.org/ 
ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/pages/piratereports.aspx. But see 
Douglas Guilfoyle, The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali 
Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?, 6 MELB. J. INT’L L. 141, 146 (2010) 
(“[D]espite the frequency of reported pirate attacks, close to 99 per cent 
of all vessels that transit the Gulf of Aden do so without coming under 
pirate attack and only a minority of such attacks result in 
hostage-taking.”). 
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and security in the region” and has authorized countries to use force 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.16 As the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted in the 
Tadić case, the involvement of the Security Council can be a relevant 
factor in the identification and characterization of armed conflict. 
However, in the specific situation of piracy and counter-piracy 
operations, the Security Council has also explicitly stated that 
UNCLOS is the legal framework applicable to combating piracy,17 
which significantly diminishes any argument that current 
counter-piracy operations amount to armed conflict. 
The other two factors—organization and the nature of the state’s 
response or operations—point definitively to the lack of any armed 
conflict. First, pirates may answer to the captain of their ship, but 
that relationship is more akin to a criminal group than a level of 
organization ordinarily sought in the characterization of armed 
conflict.18 Pirates, as a broader group, have neither a 
superior-subordinate hierarchy, nor a responsible authority similar to 
military organizations. Furthermore, different groups of pirates do not 
usually coordinate their attacks, and pirates do not control either a 
defined territory or a population. Second, the use of military force to 
combat piracy in and of itself does not signal the existence of an 
armed conflict. As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted 
in Abella v. Argentina, internal disturbances (which do not qualify as 
non-international armed conflicts) are often characterized by 
“authorities in power call[ing] upon extensive police forces, or even 
armed forces, to restore internal order.”19 Indeed, in the context of 
piracy, the use of military vessels and force rather than police units is 
a matter of necessity rather than one of choice, and, notwithstanding 
this use of military force, piracy has historically been considered to be 
outside the law of war.20  
Last, piracy can occur at the same time as or in some way related 
to a concurrent armed conflict, such as in Somalia, where a 
 
16. S.C. Res. 1851, pmbl., para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
17. Id. pmbl. 
18. See Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶ 90 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (listing 
factors to consider with regard to organization as the “existence of 
headquarters, designated zones of operation, and the ability to procure, 
transport, and distribute arms”). Guilfoyle, supra note 15, at 145 
(explaining that the fact that pirates may be organized “along clan lines 
or upon business models” or have “bosses or masterminds” is not 
enough). 
19. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 150 (1997). 
20. Michael H. Passman, Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under 
the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 16 (2008). 
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non-international armed conflict (and even an international armed 
conflict when Ethiopia invaded in 2006) has continued in fits and 
starts over the past few decades. Iraq offers another example: 
significant counter-piracy efforts took place in the mid- and late 2000s 
at the same time as the armed conflict in Iraq. In general, the 
existence of an armed conflict does not change the nature of 
counter-piracy as a genuine law enforcement operation. Thus:  
[T]he mere existence of an already high level of violence does 
not automatically transform each and every law enforcement 
operation into an involvement in a non-international armed 
conflict governed by [LOAC]. After all, even a government 
already undisputedly involved in a non-international armed 
conflict may still carry out regular law enforcement operations 
unrelated to the armed conflict that are subject merely to 
human rights law. Consequently, the mere fact that Somalia’s 
Transitional Government, with which third parties are currently 
co-operating in the attempt to repress piracy, is engaged in an 
ongoing non-international armed conflict is not in and of itself a 
decisive criterion for legal qualification of the counter-piracy 
operations as part of such a conflict.21 
Afghan and international counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan fall 
within the same framework: law enforcement operations occurring 
within the context of an armed conflict.22 
As a result, LOAC does not apply to piracy and counter-piracy 
operations. The use of force by multinational counter-piracy forces 
therefore stems from two international law sources, building on the 
UNCLOS framework set forth above. First, force can be used to 
enforce the right to stop, board, and arrest a pirate ship, where such 
force is unavoidable, reasonable, and necessary.23 The International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea upheld this framework in the 
M/V Saiga case, noted above, and the Arbitral Tribunal created 
 
21. Robin Geiss, Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-Intensity Conflicts, 
Spillover Conflicts, and Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third 
Parties, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 127, 141 (2009); see Douglas 
Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and 
IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 690, 695–
96 (2008).  
22. See 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Afghanistan 
Through Costa Rica, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 3, 2011), http:// 
www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156359.htm (describing how 
active insurgency areas account for the majority of illegal poppy 
cultivation). 
23. See Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: 
Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 401–02, 
414 (2009). 
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under UNCLOS has endorsed it in at least one subsequent case as 
well.24 Second, in accordance with these rights to enforce the law 
against piracy, it is a “general principle of law recognised by States 
that individuals can use force when necessary to protect life, subject 
to the requirement that the degree of force used shall not exceed that 
reasonably required in the circumstances.”25  
III.  Rules of Engagement 
In any military operation—whether occurring during an armed 
conflict or not—rules of engagement (ROE) are essential to the 
planning and execution of that operation. ROE are directives to 
military forces regarding the parameters of the use of force during 
military operations. ROE are based on three key components: law, 
strategy, and policy—the legal framework of LOAC or other 
applicable international law, the military needs of strategy and 
operational goals, and the national command policy of the state or 
states involved. Equally important, all ROE, whether the Standing 
ROE (SROE) for peacetime or mission-specific ROE, provide for the 
right of all troops to use force in self-defense. The San Remo ROE 
Handbook explains the role and purpose of ROE as such: 
ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the 
delineation of the circumstances and limitations within which 
military forces may be employed to achieve their objectives. 
ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, 
including execute orders, deployment orders, operational plans, 
or standing directives. Whatever their form, they provide 
authorisation for and/or limits on, among other things, the use 
of force, the positioning and posturing of forces, and the 
employment of certain specific capabilities.26 
ROE thus are intended to give operational and tactical military 
leaders greater control over the execution of military operations by 
subordinate forces. 
The SROE “provide implementation guidance on the inherent 
right of self-defense and the application of force for mission 
 
24. See Guyana v. Suriname, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, at 147 n.518 
(UNCLOS Arb. Trib. 2007), www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Guyana-
Suriname%20Award.pdf (accepting the M/V Saiga decision holding that 
force may be used, provided that it is unavoidable, reasonable, and 
necessary). 
25. Andrew Murdoch, Recent Legal Issues and Problems Relating to Acts of 
Piracy off Somalia, in SELECTED CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 139, 148 (Clive R. Symmons ed., 2011). 
26. ALAN COLE ET AL., INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK 1 (2009). 
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accomplishment [and] are designed to provide a common template for 
development and implementation of ROE for the full range of 
operations, from peace to war.”27 The SROE define individual and 
unit self-defense, distinguish between the use of force in self-defense 
and in furtherance of the mission, and provide guidance for 
understanding the concepts of hostile force, hostile act, and hostile 
intent. Furthermore, multinational operations have multinational and 
combined ROE. These ROE can often present multi-layered 
challenges, as the U.S. Army JAG School’s Operational Law 
Handbook explains: 
Each nation’s understanding of what triggers the right to 
defense is often different, and will be applied differently across 
the multinational force. Each nation will have different 
perspectives on the [law of war], and will be party to different 
[law of war] obligations that will affect its ROE. And 
ultimately, each nation is bound by its own domestic law and 
policy that will significantly impact its use of force and ROE.28 
In essence, therefore, ROE represent the intersection of law, policy, 
operational strategy, and even diplomacy or multinational 
coordination—the center of four interlocking frameworks. 
The maritime task forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean have robust ROE that include extensive cooperation 
with national law enforcement agencies as needed. Military forces 
involved in the EU’s Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operation 
Ocean Shield can board vessels, arrest and detain persons suspected of 
taking part in piracy, and use force to stop a pirate vessel or 
intervene in a hijacking.29 Recently, steps have been taken with regard 
to all three task forces to bolster their authority and capability to act 
against pirates, including enhanced boarding capabilities, aerial 
surveillance, and even attacks against pirate camps on land.30 As 
 
27. INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S 
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 76 
(William Johnson ed., 2013). 
28. Id. at 79. 
29. See NATO, Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Future Security & 
Defence Capabilities, The Challenge of Piracy: International Response 
and NATO’s Role, at 7–8, 12 (Nov. 2012); MARCOM Fact Sheet, supra 
note 1 (describing the scope of NATO anti-piracy missions); EUROPEAN 
UNION COMMITTEE, supra note 7, ¶ 34. 
30. NATO, supra note 29, ¶ 69; James M. Bridger, Safe Seas at What 
Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO’s Operation Ocean 
Shield 3 (Research Div., NATO Def. Coll., Research Paper No. 95, 
2013); EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, supra note 7, ¶ 61 (mentioning 
how the EU is taking a comprehensive approach by considering 
economic, political, and security aspects of the piracy crisis). 
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these revisions and enhancements in ROE continue, and the nature of 
the operations against pirates increases in complexity, the challenges 
described in the next section will expand, even while the success of 
the operations against pirates continues and grows. 
IV.  Multinational Coordination and Challenges 
Multinational operations—whether during armed conflict, 
counter-piracy, or other situations—require extensive coordination in 
all areas, from procedures to communication to ROE. As a result, 
such operations can face significant challenges in developing and 
maintaining an effective level of collaboration and coordination, 
notwithstanding the inherent differences between national approaches 
to issues from detention to the use of force. Incompatibilities with 
regard to ROE can prove to be one of the most difficult obstacles that 
multinational operations must address. 
In some situations, coordination challenges can stem from 
different coalition partners actually applying different legal 
frameworks. For example, while the United States has declared that it 
is in an armed conflict in Afghanistan with both the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda, coalition partners such as Germany remained reluctant, 
until recently, to characterize their involvement under the aegis of the 
International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) as an armed 
conflict.31 Thus, even within the same coalition, some nations would 
not apply the same legal framework to their activities, creating 
differing interpretations of rights and obligations. Those different legal 
frameworks naturally lead to different ROE altogether: the authority 
to use force within armed conflict is fundamentally different from the 
authority to use force outside of armed conflict.  
Even when general agreement exists among the members of a 
multinational force on the governing legal framework, as appears to 
be the case with regard to the counter-piracy operations and the three 
task forces in the Gulf of Aden, additional considerations can still 
complicate coordination on ROE. For example, states often take 
different approaches regarding how the ROE should actually be 
applied, even within the commonly accepted law enforcement and 
 
31. See Timo Noetzel, Germany’s Small War in Afghanistan: Military 
Learning amid Politico-Strategic Inertia, 31 CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 
486, 487 (2010) (“Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, speaking 
explicitly as a representative of the government as a whole, announced 
before the Bundestag that Germany now considered the conflict in all of 
Afghanistan, and thus including the northern part of the country, an 
‘armed conflict in terms of international humanitarian law.’”) (quoting 
Guido Westerwelle, Foreign Minister, Policy Statement before the 
German Bundestag on Germany’s Engagement in Afghanistan (Feb.  10, 
2010), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/ 
Presse/Reden/2010/100210-BM-BT-Afghanistan.html). 
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UNCLOS framework for counter-piracy operations. Some states take a 
more permissive approach, meaning that action is permitted unless 
the ROE expressly prohibit that action. In contrast, other states use a 
more restricted approach, meaning that action is prohibited absent an 
express authority in the ROE. These differences can be extremely 
significant, particularly in the context of a legal paradigm that strictly 
constrains the use of force, as the law enforcement and UNCLOS 
paradigm does. Indeed, “[t]he common objective of a multinational 
operation may succeed or fail on the basis of how well or how poorly 
ROE (whether an individual nation’s or a multinational force’s) are 
conceived, articulated, understood, and implemented by each member 
of the multinational operation.”32  
In the context of counter-piracy operations, coordination and 
common understandings of ROE are relevant not only in the use of 
force arena, but also with regard to detention and prosecutions. Some 
states within a multinational task force may have authority to detain 
pirates, but others will not. Few states have a regularized system for 
the prosecution of pirates, which can make decision-making difficult in 
the aftermath of capturing pirates. In some cases, states within the 
multinational task force will have agreements with states for transfer 
and prosecution of pirates, such as with the Seychelles, Kenya, or 
other designated states.33 However, the lack of such authority or 
agreements can lead to situations where captured pirates are simply 
released because there is no mechanism or plan for handling the 
post-operation process.34 Some have even argued that warships should 
not capture pirates at all, to avoid such problems.35 
To the extent that states in a multinational operation can sort 
out differences in both legal interpretations and application and 
interpretation of ROE, that is the best method to ensure the most 
 
32. Eric S. Miller, Interoperability of Rules of Engagement in Multinational 
Maritime Operations 4 (Ctr. for Naval Analyses, Research 
Memorandum CRM 95-184, 1995). 
33. See ROBIN GEISS & ANNA PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA 
AND THE GULF OF ADEN 204 (2011) (describing piracy transfer 
agreements that the Seychelles and Kenya have with the EU). 
34. For example, in September 2008, the Danish warship Absalom detained 
ten suspected pirates and held them for six days while awaiting 
instructions on what to do with the detainees. Eventually, the pirates 
were released on the beach in Somalia after Danish authorities 
concluded that there was no feasible venue for prosecuting them. See 
Murdoch, supra note 25, at 150. 
35. See Vice Admiral William Gortney, DoD News Briefing (Jan. 15, 2009) 
(transcript available at www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=4341) (stating that until operational authority is clear, 
orders will include disrupting and deterring pirates, but not capturing 
them). 
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effective coordination and execution of operations. Given the host of 
considerations that play a role in how states create and interpret 
ROE, however, differences in interpretations will continue. Therefore, 
an essential step is to address and continue to enhance how 
multinational forces can function most effectively notwithstanding 
gaps in approaches and interpretations.  
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